Introduction
In the years preceding Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999, public financial management at all ters of government had reached ts nadr. After over a decade of mltary msrule, governance had touched bottom wth the substtuton of arbtrary decsons for proper process, and the massve lootng of state assets by General Abacha. Since then, with nowhere to go but upwards, standards of public financial management have been mprovng but, as ths chapter explans, progress has been uneven, wth encouragng performance n some areas and slower change n others. Ths chapter summarzes the man developments, and then goes on to assess the current state of public financial management in Nigeria against rapidly establishing global standards. In ths way t benchmarks current performance so that future progress can be measured, and suggests the crtcal areas for early attenton by polcy leaders n the years ahead.
At first the emphasis of the new administration was on restoring rule-bound financial management, and one of the first steps of the government was to reissue Financial Instructions, the long-neglected set of regulatons governng the conduct of government financial transactions. The new government also set about tackling the overhang of nherted problems, such as external debt and nternal payment arrears, and started the process of catchng up n complaton and audtng of government accounts and financial statements. However, aggregate spending at all levels of government remaned revenue drven, as ol prces began recoverng from ther global lows at the end of mltary rule, and reached about 45 per cent of GDP by 2001, an uncharacteristically high figure for a developing country, masking huge inefficiencies in spending. Overall, rapid fiscal expansion in 1999-2001 had looked as if old habts of wasteful spendng were returnng. At the federal level there were efforts made to mprove the qualty of spendng, partcularly wth the Captal Budget, n whch there was an early realzaton that the bulk of spendng was gong on longrunnng projects of doubtful value and lttle prospect of early completon. But n the man, whle some mprovements were launched by the federal government and some of the more progressve-mnded states, much of the fundamental weakness n publc financial management remained unaddressed. It seemed that for the first four years after 1999 the challenge of government financial management reform had not really been grasped.
The pace of reform, however, pcked up at the federal level after the 2003 presdental electons, and the appontment of a new economc team wth what seemed a strong reform mandate from the president. Since then, significant steps have been taken to increase the transparency of the budget process, ensure more efficient cash management, and reform procurement processes. A major effort was made to modernize the legal framework for public financial management, through the drafting of new laws, updating the colonial era basic finance law, introducing a new audit law that promses greater ndependence to the supreme audt nsttuton, makng statutory prncples of open, compettve tenderng and creatng an autonomous procurement regulator. The government also drafted the fiscal responsibility legislation aimed at smoothng ol revenues and endng the boom/borrowng/bust syndrome of prevous ol prce cycles. In addton, Ngera became an actve member of the Extractve Industres Transparency Intatve (EITI), commttng the country to hgher standards of transparency n the management of mneral revenues.
The most postve development snce 2003 has been the pursut of a more dscplined fiscal policy by the federal government. Budgets since 2004 have been made on the bass of an assumed long run prce of ol, wth excess revenues sterlzed n the Bank of Ngera. Whle real spendng has been mantaned, the share of consoldated budget spendng n GDP has fallen to a more sustanable (and absorbable) 35 per cent. The counterpart of fiscal prudence has been the build-up of substantial foreign exchange reserves n the Central Bank. Partly n recognton of these achevements, n 2005 Ngera won substantal external debt reducton through the Pars Club.
At the same time many features of weakness in public financial management have continued. At the federal level, significant contractual and pension arrears (estmated at $3 bllon at the end of 2005) reman to be tackled, though consderable progress was made n 2006 n repayng debts to small contractors and pensoners. A unversal prncple of publc budgetng s that planned spendng should be wthn the budget and voted upon. Currently, however, about 40 per cent of non-nterest spendng admnstered by the federal government les outsde the annual budget process and thus democratc control. Ths ncludes the nvestment costs ('cash calls') of the Ngeran Natonal Petroleum Company (NNPC) and, most recently, major power and road investments jointly funded by all tiers of government. Spending financed by external borrowng and ad also les mostly outsde budgets. In the past three years extra-budgetary expendture has averaged 42 per cent of non-nterest spendng voted through the federal budget.
Although parastatal subsdes are now less that they once were, they reman sgnificant, with budget subsidization of the power, railways and ports sectors amountng to 0.9 per cent of GDP n 2004. Furthermore, the new fully funded publc penson scheme introduced in 2004 has major funding gaps, arising from the need to finance old and new penson systems smultaneously f the full costs of transton are to be borne.
However, the most persstent problem has been the qualty of spendng, wth continuing inefficiency and leakages in both the current and capital budgets. In the former there is inadequate funding of maintenance and operational costs and inflated payroll costs, due to a combination of payroll fraud and overstaffing. Projects contnue to be poorly planned and executed, wth long delays n mplementng projects. It s as f Ngera at both federal and state levels s nvestng ever-ncreasng amounts n non-yeldng assets, n the form of a lengthenng ppelne of never-completng projects. As a result, despte hgh levels of spendng n these sectors, health outcomes reman extremely low and have not mproved over the years, and adult lteracy rates and the enrolment of grls n prmary educaton reman unacceptably low for a country of Ngera's standng and ambton. Massve spendng on power generaton has not allevated power shortages, and n the roads sector hgh transport costs and poor safety condtons contnue to mpose an unacceptable burden on the economy and socety generally.
All of this points to the verdict that the problem in Nigeria is low efficiency of budget spendng rather than nadequate amounts of fundng at all levels of government. In turn the causes of low efficiency of public spending reach deep into the way n whch budgets are made and mplemented, the formal and nformal ncentves of budget actors, and the way government at all levels s managed, both bureaucratcally and politically. With continuing high oil prices, there is undoubtedly fiscal space to expand government spending, but there is a risk that, given weak public finance management (PFM) capacty, scalng up to acheve the country's development goals better may result once agan n heavy msmanagement of ol surpluses. And, as past experience has shown, there are benefits from not spending surplus revenues immedately, but spreadng ther use over the ol prce cycle. The rest of this chapter is about how Nigeria's public financial system stacks up aganst nternatonal standards, the better to see current nsttutons and ther capactes n a wder perspectve. The purpose s not to demonstrate that Ngera falls short of nternatonal best practce, but rather to show where progress has been made and where much stll remans to be done, both n the mprovement of formal rules and processes, but also n the capacty to follow them. The latter s at the heart of the challenge. For, whle the desgn of Ngera's PFM system clearly needs modernzng, even to operate t as once ntended would be an mmedate mprovement.
GlobalstandardsandthePEFAframework
In the past two decades there has been a growng nterest n developng nternatonal standards across the full spectrum of public financial management. The drvers of ths search for common standards have been several. One undoubtedly has been globalzaton and the ncrease n foregn drect nvestment. Another has been debt relef that has been condtoned not only on macroeconomc management, but also the ablty of debtor countres to ensure debt relef s used effectvely. A further factor has been the growing realization that the fight against corruption depends fundamentally on how public finances are controlled, managed, reported transparently and accounted for. Last, but by no means least, there s the advantage that, f a country's PFM can be benchmarked aganst good practce, ths wll help polcymakers chart a relevant reform course that wll move the country forward towards more effectve and sustaned use of publc resources. Thus the PEFA framework has a developmental as well as a fiduciary dimension.
The PEFA Performance Framework contans 28 ndcators dvded nto three sets. The first four look at aggregate expenditure and revenue out-turns relative to the orgnal budget, as a measure of ts credblty. The second set of sx ndcators looks at cross-cuttng ssues of comprehensveness and transparency. The thrd set, of 18 indicators, looks at the budget cycle, including whether the budget reflects government polcy prortes, whether there s predctablty and control n budget execution, the quality of accounting, recording and reporting and, finally, external scrutiny and audt.
A summary of the full ndcator set s gven n Table 11.1.
SummaryofPEFAassessmentforNigeria
The PEFA dagnostc has revealed a trend toward a system-wde upgrade n Ngera's PFM system, which reflects strong government reform commitment. In more than 
PI-9
Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities
PI-10
Public access to key fiscal information
Orderlness and partcpaton n the annual budget process PI-12
Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting
C() Predctablty and control n budget executon PI-13
Transparency of taxpayer oblgatons and labltes PI-14
Effectveness of measures for taxpayer regstraton and tax assessment PI-15
Effectveness n collecton of tax payments Predctablty n the avalablty of funds for commtment of expendtures Recordng and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees PI-18
Effectveness of payroll controls Competton, value for money and controls n procurement PI-20
Effectveness of nternal controls for non-salary expendture PI-21
Effectveness of nternal audt C() Accountng, recordng and reportng Tmelness and regularty of accounts reconclaton PI-23
Avalablty of nformaton on resources receved by servce delvery unts Qualty and tmelness of n-year budget reports PI-25
Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements C(v) External scrutny and audt Scope, nature and follow-up of external audt PI-27
Legslatve scrutny of the annual budget law PI-28
Legslatve scrutny of external audt reports half of 28 PEFA ndvdual areas, both performance and underlyng systems have mproved notceably over the last few years. However, because the ntal pre-reform level was extremely low, even after several years of reforms Ngera's PFM system remans fundamentally fragle.
The assessment also found that the Federal Government of Ngera (FGN) made advances n macroeconomc and debt management, budget formulaton, accountng, and procurement reform. However, less progress was made wth respect to capacty building, including in the Budget Office, and in such areas of financial accountability as reportng, montorng and dsclosure.
The key findings of this report with respect to financial accountability systems could be summarzed as follows: Poltcal commtment to the reform process s strong wthn the top level of the government, although n some areas ths has yet to translate nto a fully artculated development plan. The reform programme s stll n ts ntal stages, but ts mpact has already been significant on particular aspects of the PFM operations.
Whle most areas of PFM contnue to show weaknesses, these weaknesses n most cases are recognzed by the government, and approprate reform efforts are ether ongong or planned.
Overall, despite recent progress, the fiduciary assurance environment in the FGN remans weak. Thus, a pecular feature of the current PFM stuaton n Ngera s that for a number of ndcators/areas performance s mprovng but s stll qute weak. Such ndcators include budget classification, the comprehensiveness of budget documentation, publc access to budget nformaton, the transparency of taxpayer oblgatons, the effectveness of taxpayer regstraton, the management of cash balances and debts, and the qualty of n-year budget reportng.
At the same tme, for a number of ndcators, performance remans weak, and lttle or no materal progress has been made recently. These nclude the ncdence of government spending that remains off budget; the consolidation of fiscal data for enlarged government; the oversight of fiscal risk related to the operations of state enterprses; the control and collecton of tax arrears; the predctablty of government fundng; the avalablty of nformaton on funds receved by servce provders; the tmelness and qualty of annual accounts; and qualty/depth of legslatve scrutny of the budget.
Moreover, the reforms that promse to advance budget transparency and expendture efficiency, including those in procurement, have been much slower at the subnatonal level, where more than half of consoldated budget expendtures are admnstered.
Given the constitutional autonomy of state governments in fiscal and financial management matters, the FGN can do lttle by way of drect nterventon. Instead, the FGN should look for an alternatve, more cooperatve approach for engagng the states n PFM reforms by provdng them wth techncal assstance, gvng them financial incentives, and generating political benefits for sub-national leaders that are eager to reform. The standard here is defined in terms of the extent to which the budget as executed over the past three years devates from the budget as approved, and s based upon prmary expendture, n other words t excludes debt servce, and also excludes externally funded project expendture. There are several reasons for wantng as lttle devaton as possble between the budget ex ante and the budget ex post. The first is predictability of funding for budget users, the mnstres, departments and agences whch delver servces. A second s macroeconomc management. Thrd s democratc accountablty, n the sense that the budget s a contract to execute polces and undertake functons between the executve and the legslature as authorzer of revenues and spendng. Here the federal government's performance has been mprovng, but from a very low base. In 2003 total spendng, excludng debt servce, fell short by 38.3 per cent of approprated spending, chiefly because capital releases were 71.4 per cent less than the approved budget. Ths was partly because total revenues were 9.1 per cent less than antcpated, but chiefly because the legislature in approving the budget more than doubled the capital budget relative to what the executive proposed, much of it on unjustified pork-barrel projects. Ths left the executve no alternatve but to restrct releases to avoid an exploding budget deficit.
Ths pattern repeated tself the followng two years, but n a less extreme way, as the executve has ntroduced pre-budget consultatons wth the legslature on the overall macroeconomc framework wthn whch budgets must be made and executed. Overall, the average expendture devaton n 2004-05 declned to only 5.3 per cent, whereas t exceeded 28 per cent n 2001-03. Even so, the federal government falls a long way short of acceptable standards of budget predctablty, and ths s one of the factors that contribute to the inefficiency of spending. State governments show a smlar msmatch between approved and executed budgets, but ths s less due to state legslatures expandng the governor's budget, and more about governors proposing ambitious capital programs and being unable to either finance or execute them.
The underlyng need at the natonal level s to reach greater accord between the executve and the legslature on the sze and content of budgets. Unlke other countres n sub-Saharan Afrca, whch have evolved ther budget systems from an orgnal Westmnster model, n Ngera there are no restrctons on the ablty of the legslature to change the presdent's budget. For some observers ths s a dangerous flaw in Nigeria's constitutional arrangements, given that more than three quarters of government revenues derve not from taxes on ctzens (whch would constran lawmakers) but from ol. For others, the power to change the executve's budget s fundamental to the principle of separation of powers. In practical terms, fiscal management and effectve budget executon are mpossble f large expendture devatons persst. The draft Fscal Responsblty Law, whch seeks to bnd governments at all levels to makng budgets conservatvely on the bass of an assumed long-run prce of ol s a vtal component of better budgetng arrangements. So also are the efforts in recent years of the Budget Office of the Federation to brief the National Assembly on the fiscal outlook, and seek their support for budgets made within a Medum Term Expendture Framework (MTEF).
PI-2: Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approvedbudget
Ths ndcator measures the extent to whch actual expendture composton vares from the composton of the orgnal budget. The ratonale of the ndcator s that budgets should be capable of mplementng the polces and programmes proposed by the executve and approved by the legslature.
At the federal level there s relatvely lttle devaton between the share of the man sector mnstres, departments and agences (MDAs) n the approved and the executed budget. Furthermore, any devatons that can be measured are dwarfed by the large devatons at the aggregate level. Ths suggests that, when the executve cuts the budget back from what t vews as the unsustanably hgh levels approved by the legslature, the pan s shared equally -no mnstry s dsproportonally protected from t.
What the ndcator does not measure s reallocatons wthn MDA budgets. Ths s large. When budgets are cut, the wage bll s protected at the expense of operatons and maintenance spending, and this contributes to inefficiency. There is also redistrbuton wthn the captal budget, as funds are drected towards what the executve regards as hgher-prorty projects. When ths results n the completon rather than partial implementation of projects, the reallocations are efficiency enhancing. However, the latter has not been common budget executon practce n Ngera. A smlar pattern can be found at the state level.
PI-3: Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget
Ths ndcator measures the realsm of government revenue projectons, and the nternational standard defined in the PEFA framework is for actual revenue collections not to fall below 97 per cent of budgeted domestc revenues n more than one of the past three years.
Ngera's record n recent years has been one of exceedng domestc revenue forecasts, chiefly thanks to unexpectedly high international oil prices. But this was due more to luck than good plannng. If ol revenues are set to one sde and devatons n non-ol tax collectons are analysed, a rather dfferent pcture emerges. In both 2003 and 2004 the actual nternally generated revenue (IGR) collected amounted to only about one thrd of the budgeted level. Ths ponts to weak collecton and unrealstc budgetng.
A smlar pattern of weak IGR collecton shows up at the state level, wth a few exceptons. Lagos State has made dramatc mprovements n IGR snce the transton from mltary rule, by contractng out collectons, albet at a hgh overhead cost. Now the state s tryng to nsttutonalze sound tax admnstraton n the newly formed Bureau of Internal Revenue.
PI-4:Stockandmonitoringofexpenditurepaymentarrears
PEFA best practce benchmarks two varables: () the stock of arrears, whch should be below 2 per cent of total expendture, and () relable and complete data on the stock of arrears generated through routne procedures, regularly updated.
Hgh levels of arrears are a consequence of large devatons between the approved and executed budget, and n Ngera's case there s a backlog nherted from the years of mltary msrule, for whch the data are unrelable. By late 2005, total arrears at the federal level were estmated at not less than 400 bllon nara ($3 bllon), whch was more than 20 per cent of the total 2005 federal government budget spendng. The man categores of budget arrears presently are debts to contractors and overdue penson payments. There are also arrears on utlty payments and payments to nternatonal organzatons. Total contractors' arrears are estmated at 275-300 bllon nara (about 2.2 per cent of 2005 GDP), and have been the subject of successve screenng exercses. Consderable progress has been made n buldng up a database in the Budget Office of the Federation (BOF), verifying, auditing and deflating the reported clams. Small contractor arrears are n the process of beng pad off; large contractor arrears are beng securtzed.
Penson arrears have accumulated under the FGN's tradtonal pay-as-you-go defined benefit scheme for public servants, and pension rolls have long been unreliable. 
PI-5: Classification of the budget
Best practce s the operaton of budget systems that are based on the admnstratve, economic and sub-functional/programme classifications, using Government Financial Statistics/Classification of Functions of Government standards.
Nigeria's budgets at all levels of government employ traditional classification systems, which are based mainly on administrative classifications and some economic classifications. In this way the country has lagged behind international developments that have seen the emergence and adopton of unversal standards whch, wth modern nformaton technology, can provde polcy-makers and budget managers wth nformaton on PFM n a tmely and more meanngful way. Furthermore, the broader budgeting, reporting and accounting system, of which the classification system forms a central part, has deterorated n ts applcaton over the years. The budget estmates are mostly too detaled for legslatve oversght, and the accounts are too coarse-grained for management purposes, while the classification system allows no functonal analyss.
As long as the prmary objectve of PFM mprovements s better control of spending by budget units, an administrative-based classification system serves. And the most urgent need s better n-year reportng by MDAs under the present system. But, as the polcy behnd spendng becomes more mportant, a more modern budget classification system will be demanded. Some steps are now being taken, partly by the Accountant-General of the Federaton, to mprove reportng (through the Accountng Transacton Reportng and Recordng System (ATRRS)), and to amend the exstng chart of accounts. Also the introduction of integrated financial management systems n some states on ther own account s promptng change.
PI-6: Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation
A best-practce budget wll provde nformaton on the macroeconomc assumptons underlying the budget, the fiscal deficit defined by international standards and financing, financial assets at the beginning of the year and prior years' out-turns, explanations of the budgetary implications of new policies, tax expenditures and fiscal risk, summaries of budget data, including institutional, economic and functional classificaton, as well as detals of proposed spendng at an approprate level of detal.
Currently the package of documents that consttutes the FGN's budget lacks analytcal tables, and summares have become more cursory n recent years, a vctm of the rush to complete the budget and the lack of n-depth capacty n the BOF. The budget stresses government prortes such as the Ngera Economc Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) but does not explan well how these are translated nto spendng allocatons. In other respects, the FGN s movng forward. It has begun the development of a medium-term fiscal framework for the budget, which wll eventually evolve nto a fuller Medum Term Expendture Framework (MTEF). A crtcal step towards lnkng these better has been the recent requrement for mnstres to prepare Medum Term Sectoral Strateges (MTSS).
The budget presentaton has changed lttle n decades, wth a gap between the budget speech, whch s very aggregate, and the mass of detal n the estmates but wthout analytcal summary tables. Such an unbalanced presentaton stmulates legislators (who need little prompting) to ignore the underlying fiscal strategy of the submtted budget proposal and mmerse themselves n the detals of spendng.
PI-7:Extentofunreportedgovernmentoperations
Governments should am for comprehensve budgets and accounts that cover all revenue and expenditure flows for all institutional units that are part of that government ter to whch the budget pertans. In practcal terms ths means ensurng that unreported extra-budgetary expendture (other than donor-funded projects, whch can be difficult to capture) is insignificant (below 1 per cent of total expenditure).
As already noted in this chapter, a significant proportion (42 per cent of non-interest expendture on average n the past three years) of spendng by federal enttes les outsde the federal budget. Ths serously undermnes the comprehensveness of the annual budget. The main categories of spending outside the budget are: (i) first line charges of the Federation Accounts (chiefly investment costs of NNPC), (ii) donor funds, and (iii) expenditure financed with MDA's own revenues. In 2005 settlement of external debt arrears as part of the hstorc Pars debt deal was extra-budgetary. Snce 2005 a further category has been added -major nfrastructure nvestments (prmarly power) funded wth money that s accumulated n the excess ol savngs account.
Constitutional interpretation and budgetary principles appear to be in conflict
wth respect to ths extra-budgetary spendng. In partcular, NNPC cash calls and debt relef payments are common purpose spendng made by federal government enttes, whch the Supreme Court n 2002 determned were outsde the federal government's jursdcton. As a result, a separate approval procedure has been establshed for ths spendng, nvolvng the Federaton Account Allocaton Commttee (FAAC), the Federal Executve Councl (FEC) and the Natonal Assembly, wth audtng by the Audtor-General of the Federaton. However, ths results n a segmented expendture process, and makes t less transparent and accountable. A possble soluton to ths problem could be ncorporaton of such common purpose spendng n the regular FGN's budget, perhaps as a separate part.
Including donor-financed spending in the budget is a problem in many poor countres, and n the case of Ngera s perhaps a lesser problem because the magntude of donor assistance in relative terms is not so great. Still, it would be prudent to reflect at least all government external borrowng n the budget. More mportantly, the falure to nclude the own revenues of parastatals, whch are partly dependent on budget transfers, n the budget, even f only for nformaton rather than appropraton, does undermne the transparency and accountablty of the budget system. A smlar stuaton exsts at the state level.
PI-8: Transparency of intergovernmental fiscal relations
The goal here s a rule-based, transparent and predctable system for the allocaton of funds between dfferent ters of government, enablng sub-natonal governments to make realstc projectons for federal transfers, and that actual releases durng the year are made n a regular and predctable way. For earmarked transfers, there should be a means, ether though publshed accounts or statstcal surveys, to ensure that these have been used for their intended purpose by their ultimate beneficiaries.
The dvson of responsbltes s generally set out n the 1999 consttuton, whch descrbes the exclusve responsblty of the FGN for functons of natonal concern, lke defence and foregn affars, concurrent responsbltes of federal and state governments, such as secondary and tertary educaton, and responsbltes of local government authortes (LGAs) such as water and santaton, together wth responsbltes such as prmary educaton and health whch LGAs may cooperate wth state governments n delverng. Overall, there s consderable overlap n expendture responsibilities and insufficient clarity of expenditure mandates.
The bulk of revenues for all three ters of government derve from ol. Ol revenues and natonally collected taxes are channelled to the three ters through the Federaton and VAT Accounts, accordng to a formula approved by both houses of the Natonal Assembly, and overseen by the Revenue Moblzaton, Allocaton and Fscal Commsson (RMAFC). The formula takes specal account of such factors as populaton, socal development, revenue effort, land mass and terran, as well as equalty n dstrbuton. Ol-producng states receve an addtonal 'dervaton' allocaton. Not unexpectedly, the formula s hotly debated and zealously watched. The formula s supposed to be updated every five years on the basis of proposals developed by the RMAFC, but ths dd not take place recently on grounds of lack of consensus.
The flow of transfers is generally predictable and transparent. There are two issues, however, which affect transparency. The first is prior deductions from the Federaton Account, both statutory deductons and jont venture cash calls of NNPC, and admnstratvely determned deductons such as the set-asde 'excess crude' revenues, and the domestc petroleum subsdy. As already noted, there are arrangements for oversght of these deductons, but they are not part of the annual budget process of the federal Government. There has also been lack of transparency over the generaton of ol revenues, but ths s mprovng wth Ngera's partcpaton n the Extractve Industres' Transparency Intatve (EITI). The second ssue whch detracts from the transparency and predctablty of the ntergovernmental transfer process s the poorly regulated wthholdng by state governments of transfers to local governments for the executon of jont programmes.
PI-9: Oversight of aggregate fiscal riskfromotherpublicsectorentities
Best practice is centralized oversight of fiscal risk through timely reports and audited accounts from all major autonomous agences and publc enterprses, rules whch prevent sub-national governments from generating fiscal liabilities for the central government, regular monitoring of the net fiscal position of all levels of sub-national government, and regular consolidation of these reports into an overall fiscal risk assessment by the central government.
There are presently several sources of risk to Nigeria's public finances. While the country's large parastatal sector is required by law to present accounts and financal statements to state and federal audtors-general, submssons are often late, and there are no regular in-year financial reports, a matter of serious concern, given the generally weak performance of budget-dependent autonomous agences and publc enterprses, whch have shown an alarmng tendency over tme to accumulate large debts and other labltes.
A second source of fiscal risk is the lack of a hard budget constraint on state governments and the absence of a mechanism for monitoring their fiscal positions. In the first years of the return to civilian rule, many states borrowed heavily from domestic financial markets, short-term and at high cost, and, until rising oil prices improved ther revenues, servcng ths debt dstorted budgets and n many cases led to arrears in salaries and other payments. The third source of fiscal risk, obviously, is the heavy dependence of governments n Ngera on revenues from ol and the attendant ol prce cycle.
Of vital importance to the management of fiscal risk at all levels is the outcome of current efforts to put in place a new legal framework for public financial management, and thus a more responsble budget process. Crtcal here are the Fscal Responsblty Bll (FRB), the Budget Procedure Bll, and amendments to the 1958 Fnance (Control and Management) Act (F(C&M)A). As currently drafted, the FRB, which includes the fiscal rule that budgets should be made on the basis of the longrun prce of ol, s ntended to be bndng on states and LGAs. Progressve states are begnnng to look at how the state level budget process could be strengthened, but there are not yet explct state equvalents to the F(C&M)A.
PI-10: Public access to key fiscal information
The standard here s the publc avalablty of a complete budget package as soon as t s tabled n the legslature, of n-year budget executon reports, tmely year-end audited financial statements, external audit reports, and regular publication of contract awards above $100,000.
Here Ngera scores very poorly; there s very lttle nformaton on Ngera's government finances that is available to the public on a timely basis. This may be because the nformaton does not exst, or s not complete or avalable n a tmely way. Alternatvely, t can be that authortes decde not to release nformaton because of ts supposed senstve nature. Some mprovement s takng place. The Central Bank published summaries of the budget aggregates and related financial information, and both the Federal Mnstry of Fnance (FMoF) and the BOF now have webstes, and the amount of nformaton, partcularly n the Central Bank ste, s growng. In addton, there s now an actve consortum of publc polcy NGOs n Ngera demandng more transparent public finances. This is encouraging; at bottom the challenge is to develop a culture amongst government officials to regularly release and not withhold the type of information on government finances that is normal in a democratic country. Partly, the exstng culture s a legacy of mltary rule, when any release of information could get an official into serious trouble. It is also driven by a fear that release of any nformaton could be msrepresented for poltcal gan. The soluton to leaks and dstorton of released nformaton s, of course, regular and tmely publcaton of a much wder range of publc nformaton, wthholdng only nformaton that truly should be secret, for ether personal or securty reasons.
PI-11:Orderlinessandparticipationintheannualbudgetprocess
The am here s a clear and predctable budget calendar whch gves stakeholders sufficient time to participate in the budget process, communicates cabinet-approved budget celngs to MDAs n the call crcular, and enables the legslatureto approve the budget before the start of the newfinancial year.
In Ngera, at all levels of government, the budget calendar s an admnstratve tradton, not set by law. Whle the BOF endeavours to complete the budget estmates for the presdent to make hs budget speech n md-October, so that the legslature can approve the next year budget by the end of the current financial year, this seldom happens, ether because the legslature takes longer, or because budget preparaton s delayed. In recent years, notwthstandng efforts to get the budget approved n tme, the Appropriations Bill was not passed until after the first quarter of the new financial year, necesstatng provsonal fundng warrants. Ths s compounded by the often fractous relatons between the executve and the legslature, multple changes n the budget as proposed by the presdent, and multple adjustments to releases after the budget has been approved, n order, n the executve's vew, to restore balance to spendng plans. Often ths has meant that md-year has come before the BOF has completed the launch of the current year's budget, postponng yet agan the goal of launchng the next year's budget preparaton on an orderly tme path. Ths results n insufficient time to explain to the legislature and get their understanding of the macroeconomic fundamentals underpinning public finances, to get ministers to agree collectvely to the budget framework, and to allow MDAs to prortze ther spendng.
However, there have been some mportant developments n recent years. The BOF now makes a serious effort to explain the fiscal framework to the legislature at the outset of the budget preparaton process. And MDAs, ntally on a plot bass, have begun preparng ther Medum Term Sector Strateges (MTSS), wth the help of consultants, as an effort to get resources better focused on polcy prortes pror to detailed budget preparation. For the first time, the BOF was able to undertake these actons and get the 2007 budget placed before the Natonal Assembly by the mddle of October.
At the state level, wth the governor domnatng executve-legslature relatons and wth greater scope for patronage, there s typcally not the contentous relaton-shp that characterzes relatons at the federal level. Ths enables budgets to be submtted on tme, and generally passed before or shortly after the end of the current financial year. But other problems manifest themselves, such as unrealistic budget estmates, poorly coordnated current and captal budgets, poor qualty publc nvestment plans, and slow executon.
Three developments are crucal to nsttutonalzng a more orderly and partcpatory budget process. The first is the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, and assocated PFM legslaton at federal and state levels. The second s rasng the capacty of BOF staff (and ther counterparts n state budget and plannng departments). The thrd s more harmonous relatons between the executve and the legslature at the natonal level on budget matters. The last of these s partly structural, and therefore difficult to change, partly a matter of political incentives of elected officials who seek to add programmes they can be associated with to budgets, and partly amenable to better communcatons and stronger accountablty arrangements, whch have begun to mprove.
PI-12: Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting
Best practice is three-year or more rolling forecasts of fiscal aggregates, on which annual budgets are based, annual debt sustanablty analyses for both domestc and external debt, exstence of sector strateges wth full costng of recurrent and nvestment spending, broadly consistent with fiscal forecasts, and selection of investments based upon ther relevance to sector strateges and recurrent cost mplcatons, and consstent wth sector envelopes and forward budget estmates.
Here the federal government s well ahead of states. In the past three years, the BOF has prepared multi-year aggregate fiscal frameworks, based upon conservatve estmates of the expected prce of ol, and used ths framework to bref both the legslature and the Federal Executve Councl on the forthcomng budget preparaton cycle. The BOF, as yet, has not effectvely evolved the aggregate framework nto a set of medum-term sector envelopes based upon the cost of exstng and agreed future polcy, though the launchng of the MTSS process s an mportant step n ths drecton. In the jargon of budget-makng, at the federal level, Ngera has an MTFF but not an MTEF.
At the state level, mult-year budget plannng s less advanced. Although a few states have evnced nterest n gvng a medum-term perspectve to budgetng, all effectively make budgets on an annual basis, and the culture of budgeting is firmly rooted n the old dual budget rollng publc nvestment plan model.
The challenge s movng from the dual budget model, n whch nvestment spendng domnates, to one n whch servce delvery gudes the makng of budgets. Ths requres lookng at budgets n a much more ntegrated way, balancng captal wth recurrent spendng wthn an overall sector (or MDA) resources envelope. Techncally, ths requres much better nformaton on costs of servce delvery and these must be generated, as also must information on the efficiency and effectiveness of spendng (whch s very poor at present). It also requres a major nvestment n capacty building of budget staff, both in budget offices and in line ministries, at all levels of government. Most of all, t requres a sea change n the culture of publc spendng n Ngera, n a way that makes the consstent delvery of core publc servces the drver of spendng decsons, rather than ambtous, poorly thought-through, badly executed and often unsustanable captal spendng schemes.
PI-13:Transparencyoftaxpayerobligationsandliabilities
Taxpayer labltes need to be spelled out n clear and comprehensve laws and regulatons, backed up by effectve taxpayer educaton and a properly functonng tax appeals mechansm.
Evdence from enterprse surveys suggests that tax regulatons and how they are appled are a constrant to busness development, crtera for tax wavers are unclear n ther applcaton, and taxpayer educaton has a long way to go at both federal and state levels. Tax appeals mechansms exst but they are complex and ther effectveness is difficult to assess.
Actions to remedy these deficiencies are under way. The Federal Internal Revenue Servce (FIRS) has ntated a package of legslatve amendments to tax laws, remedyng some of the exstng faults n VAT, such as the absence of a regstraton threshold, improvements to the appeals mechanisms, and a clearer definition of the tmetable for dspute resoluton. There s also a need to smplfy the overall tax structure, ncludng subnatonal taxes and fees, to elmnate varous secondary taxes that brng lttle revenue but generate consderable admnstratve cost to the prvate sector. A further challenge s buldng the capacty of staff.
PI-14: Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment
The focus of ths ndcator s on the exstence and accuracy of controls n the taxpayer regstraton system, effectveness of penaltes for non-complance wth tax regstraton, and adequate plannng and montorng of tax audts and fraud nvestgatons. Coordnaton between FIRS headquarters and ts branches n the states, whch are responsble for regsterng taxpayers, s weak, leadng to naccuraces n taxpayer nformaton and consequently n tax collectons. There s no sngle taxpayer regster yet. Non-complance penaltes are ether too low to consttute an ncentve or too complex to be effectve. The recently establshed audt departments of FIRS lack capacty, and wth no systematc collecton of tax data, let alone ndustry data, the process of risk identification cannot be begun.
Efforts are under way to construct a sngle taxpayer database whch wll be computerized, enabling the adoption of a single Tax Identification Number (TIN). This needs to be accompaned by valdaton of exstng taxpayer data and buldng of staff capacty, especally for audt.
PI-15:Effectivenessincollectionoftaxpayments
Best practice is defined as a high ratio of collection of tax arrears relative to their stock, regular transfers of collected taxes from a revenue authorty to treasury, and accounts reconclaton between tax assessments, collectons, arrears records and recepts by the treasury.
Present arrangements n Ngera fall below the standard. There s no database on tax arrears classfyng arrears by amounts and tax type at the levels of the Federaton and states (whch collect Personal Income Tax), whle reconclatons are ncomplete and less than regular. At the federal level, there are reforms under way n FIRS, as well as n the state wth the largest tax base, Lagos. Over tme, as staff capacty and better systems are bult, ths should lead to mproved performance. Autonomous status of revenue agences, whch s proposed n recent legslaton, s mportant to make staff salares more compettve than regular cvl servce scales. Ths would help, combned wth better oversght and governance, to break the nformal practces that have become embedded n many areas.
PI-16: Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures
For budgets to be predctable, they need to be approved on tme, respected by the executive, flexible enough to accommodate a reasonable level of fiscal uncertainty, and supported by a cash management system that ensures that the government s never llqud.
Analyss of actual monthly releases to spendng departments over the past four years shows continuation of significant variability in the amounts provided by the treasury. Ths expendture nstablty s only partly explanable by monthly revenue variations, which have fluctuated somewhat less recently; this stabilization is in part thanks to oil-price-based budgeting. The introduction of an oil-price-based fiscal rule, however, has helped less than hoped for because t does not smooth varatons n ol producton; wth domestc petroleum prce controls n place, budgetary resources have had to be diverted to offsetting fuel subsidies that fluctuate in line with world oil prces. In addton, on the expendture sde the government has struggled wth cash management and delays in procurement certification.
As long as petroleum subsdes are mantaned, the budget wll always be vulnerable to prce shocks n nternatonal ol markets. Deepenng the market for government securtes, mproved cash management, ncludng the adopton of a sngle treasury account, mproved procurement capacty on the part of MDAs, and approval of a realstcally szed budget much earler n the year are the key steps to mprove the predictability of funds for efficient and effective public expenditure.
PI-17: Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees
In well functonng PFM systems, domestc and foregn debt records are complete, regularly updated, reconcled and reported to management on a regular bass. All cash balances are calculated daly and consoldated, and central government's contractng of loans and ssuance of guarantees are made aganst transparent crtera and fiscal targets, and all have to be approved by a single responsible government entity.
Currently, budget funds are released to MDAs, whch keep ther own accounts wth commercal banks, wthout central oversght. Ths means that no one knows how large are government cash balances wth the commercal banks, whch earn no nterest, makng for unnecessary borrowng by the treasury from ether the Central Bank or the relatvely thn domestc market n government paper. Ths has been especally costly gven the hgh level of domestc nterest rates n recent years. Ths makes cash management one of the weakest areas of PFM n Ngera, pontng to the need for tmely ssue of warrants, greater oversght of cash balances and eventually ntroducton of a sngle treasury account, replacng the Central Bank overdraft faclty wth open market operatons to meet short-term lqudty needs, and ncreased ablty of the government Cash Management Commttee to reduce varablty n cash releases.
By contrast, at the federal level the area of debt management has been one of strong advance, with the formation of the Debt Management Office under the FMoF and ts acquston of consderable expertse n the area of external debt, on whch t has focused. Ths was a major factor supportng Ngera's favourable debt relef terms from the Pars Club n 2005. Furthermore, the DMO Act of 2003 and subsequent gudelnes lay down strct rules for federal MDAs, parastatals and state government external borrowng. State governments can contract new external debt only with the permission of the FMoF, normally given only after DMO financial analysis, Federal Executve Councl and Natonal Assembly approval. Parastatals typcally borrow through the FMoF, whch contracts the loan and on-lends the proceeds, thus ensuring the amount is captured in the sovereign debt profile. State domestic borrowng must be consstent wth rules of the Securty and Exchange Commsson (SEC), whch, n default, provde deducton of the amounts due by the FMoF from federaton account transfers to a partcular state.
PI-18:Effectivenessofpayrollcontrols
Governments wth good payroll controls can lnk drectly and regularly reconcle personnel records, staffing authorization and payroll systems. Changes are updated at least monthly, and retroactve adjustments are rare. Authorty to change records and payroll s restrcted and results n an audt tral, and there s a strong system of annual payroll audts to dentfy control weaknesses and/or ghost workers.
The FGN operates a decentralzed payroll system for the cvl servce, whereby MDAs operate ther own payrolls, consstent wth government-wde procedures set by the Accountant-General. In theory, the payroll s lnked to the personnel records system, and the formal rules are sound. In practce, some of the abuse that became wdespread under mltary rule has contnued and, notwthstandng many staff censuses, payroll fraud has not yet been fully elmnated. The weakest part of the payroll control system is the establishment list, in theory the approved staffing structure of each MDA. In practce, ths has lost credblty, and the bass of control has become the payroll alone. Parastatals, whose combned employment exceeds by far that of the cvl servce proper, le outsde ths system, and also have weak payroll controls.
A major effort s now under way to replace the present largely manual systems of the FGN wth an ntegrated payroll and personnel management system. Ths s an mportant step forward n strengthenng payroll controls. As t s ntroduced, t wll be mportant to ensure the accuracy of personnel data entered nto the new system, f necessary through further staff audts.
PI-19:Competition,valueformoneyandcontrolsinprocurement
The benchmark for publc procurement s open rule-based competton, appled to at least 75 per cent of contracts above the threshold, with full justification for less compettve procurement methods, and a complants mechansm that provdes for tmely resoluton of procurement process dsputes, under the oversght of an external body, wth publcly accessble data on complants resoluton.
Publc procurement s an area where the government has made consderable progress at the federal level, aganst a background of large-scale abuse durng the years of mltary rule of what was orgnally a sound process, through rgged, noncompettve and costly award of contracts. The ntal efforts of cvlan government were to deal wth an overhang of contractors' clams, reducng or elmnatng the most egregous ones. From 2001 the FGN began puttng n place a more robust system of procurement oversght, through the nsttuton of 'due process' and the creaton of the Budget Montorng and Prce Intellgence Unt (BMPIU). Departmental tender boards were abolshed and replaced wth mnsteral tender boards, subject to oversght by BMPIU. The government ntroduced clear rules for compettve tenderng, avodance of contract splttng, natonal advertsng, and transparent bd and proposal evaluaton crtera. BMPIU has been hghly successful n reducng contract costs, and its certification of 'due process' is required before the release of budgetary funds by the Accountant-General. The focus thus far of 'due process' has been the Captal Budget. Rules for drect contractng have been tghtened.
Legslaton s now before the Natonal Assembly that would convert BMPIU nto an autonomous procurement regulator wthn the executve branch, empowered to ssue procurement rules, consstent wth statutory prncples of open compettve tenderng, and wth a separate appeals mechansm. It wll be mportant for ths legslaton to be passed, mplemented n substance as well as n form, and emulated by the other ters of government, whch generally have not moved yet to renstate open compettve tenderng as effectvely as the FGN. At the state level, contracts of any magntude are effectvely determned by the governor. At all levels of government procurement staff need to be traned, preferably through the establshment of a specalst procurement cadre, and steps taken to ensure that both captal and current budget contractng of works, goods and servces are compettve.
PI-20:Effectivenessofinternalcontrolsfornon-salaryexpenditure
Best practce entals comprehensve expendture commtment controls whch effectvely lmt commtments to actual cash avalable and approved budget allocatons, supported by other relevant nternal controls and rules, wth hgh complance, nsgnificant misuse, and very limited use of emergency procedures.
The FGN's current control framework dates back to the pre-ndependence Fnance (Control and Management) Act of 1958, and Fnancal Regulatons ssued thereafter (the latest beng n 1999 -essentally a ressue). Though fundamentally sound, the present system reles manly upon manual procedures of accountng and reportng; although ts abuse s less than what t used to be under mltary rule, there s wdespread dsregard of all types of controls. The same control framework operates n states (though there s no actual state legslaton n place, just regulatons), and the same lack of financial discipline applies as well. At all levels, there is far too frequent resort to emergency exceptons. Aware of the weakness n nternal controls, the FMoF seeks to control spendng through cash ratonng.
In theory, furnshng monthly budget executon reports should be a condton of cash release, but ths s not strctly appled and many MDAs run late wth ther reportng. Poor record-keepng of commtments by MDAs and ther falure to regularly report on both actual spendng and outstandng commtments mean that the FMoF has lttle knowledge of the magntude of commtments accumulated durng the year.
The remakng of the budget through the cash release system, necessary n the executve's vew to restore macroeconomc balance and spendng prortes to the budget, leads to delays and unpredctablty of fundng to MDAs. The late release causes low capital budget spending within the fiscal year, and thus a large carry-over.
Instead of makng ths a charge aganst next year's budget, the FMoF n the past two years has contnued fundng the carry-over aganst the orgnal appropraton, n the face of poltcal pressure to mplement captal budget spendng. Ths has resulted n an effective extension of the financial year up to at least next June and the spending n 2006 of around $2 bllon of 2005 appropratons from the captal account. Ths practce undermnes the annualty of the budget.
Steps are beng taken to modernze expendture control and asset management systems across government. The cash release system has been tghtened, so that cash balances n MDA commercal bank accounts declned. Due process has sharply re-duced excessve advance fee payments on contracts. The FMoF now receves more timely information on ministerial spending, and the Accountant-General's Office has been taking the first steps towards installing an integrated financial management system. The challenge now s to ncrease the pressure on MDAs to report and reconcle accounts, placing sanctions on those accounting officers who do not exercise proper stewardship over their votes, and to place greater emphasis on financial management as a crteron of career advancement wthn the cvl servce. Smlar challenges preval at the state level, where a small number of states have nvested n ntegrated financial management systems (for example Lagos and Delta), but generally financal dscplne s weak.
PI-21:Effectiveinternalaudit
The benchmark s operatonal nternal audt for all central government enttes that meets professional standards and focuses on systemic issues, adheres to a fixed schedule, and produces reports to the audited entity, the finance ministry and the supreme audit institution. Action by management on internal audit findings is prompt and comprehensve.
At both federal and state levels, nternal audt unts exst n most MDAs, staffed by audtors posted by the Accountant-General. The emphass s on complance rather than systems audtng. There s no separate career stream for audtors, who are drawn from the wder pool of government accountants, the mnorty of whom are professionally qualified. The weaknesses of the present system are recognized, including the difficulty in recruiting and retaining professionally qualified staff on government pay scales. The OAGF has been makng efforts to tran staff n modern audtng technques, and to encourage unts to undertake more system-based audts.
The greatest constrant s not lack of capacty, however. Rather t s weakness on the demand side of the financial accountability equation. Presently, the climate for PFM at all levels of government is 'soft', with few officers sanctioned for irregularities. Thus management response to internal audit findings is disappointing, and this feeds back to the qualty of audt. To tghten the system, the FMoF, wth the presdent's backng, needs more emphatcally to wthhold releases to departments whch fail to address deficiencies in their control systems. Only when accounting officers have a strong ncentve to demand the products of nternal audt, wll performance move to the hgher level.
PI-22:Timelinessandregularityofaccountsreconciliation
In modern financial management systems, bank account reconciliation is fully automated and done at least on a daly bass. For PEFA the standard s reconclaton for all central government bank accounts at least monthly at aggregate and detaled levels, wth reconclaton and clearance of suspense accounts at least quarterly, wthn a month from the end of perod and wth few balances brought forward.
Reconclaton of bank accounts s begnnng to mprove wth the mplementaton of the ATRRS, wth more MDAs reportng ther accounts transcrpts, ncludng bank reconclaton statements, on tme. A contnung challenge s the volume of advances to public employees in the form of per diems for workshops and other benefits, in turn a product of the use of these as quas salary supplements to augment low pay. Advances are also pad to contractors, though abuse n ths area has been much reduced recently. Encouragngly, n 2006 the OAGF has been empowered to wthhold releases from MDAs whch default n the monthly submsson of budget executon reports, and has selectvely begun dong so. The corollary, though, s that, wthout an external stmulus, MDAs see lttle ntrnsc value n reconclng ther bank accounts and generally operating effective financial control systems. In turn this reflects the soft financial management culture that pervades the public sector at all levels; changng ths to make reportng and accountng valued for ts own sake s a major governance challenge for future admnstratons.
PI-23: Availability of information on resources received by service deliveryunits
Best practce s routne data collecton or accountng systems whch provde relable nformaton on all types of resources receved n cash and n knd by both prmary schools and prmary health clncs across the country. Ths nformaton s compled nto reports at least annually.
As a federal state, Ngera's accountng nformaton on resources used by servce delvery unts wll always be spread over a large number of governments, rendering difficult the consolidation of information on a regular basis. Currently, there s no drect accountng nformaton avalable at the federal level regardng the full amount of resources used wthn key segments of the publc sector because there s no system for aggregate consoldaton of accountng nformaton from states and local governments. Moreover, external grants and loans are not covered by the exstng budget process. Thus t s not possble to say how much total publc spendng there s on basc socal servces n Ngera. Furthermore, at local government level, there s wdespread msallocaton and msreportng of expendtures. The avalablty of budget nformaton at the local level s very low, and the budgets of ndvdual frontlne servce provders are unobtanable to local communty groups, who beleve that much of the money s ether sphoned off or spent on salares.
A promsng development s the arrangements now n place to montor the use of savngs from the Pars Club debt relef, whch the FGN has commtted to spend on Mllennum Development Goal programmes. These wll be ntensvely montored, including by programme beneficiaries. The hope is that the monitoring of MDG programmes wll spearhead better montorng and reportng practce across government.
PI-24:Qualityandtimelinessofin-yearbudgetreports
Best practce n n-year reportng entals: () presentaton of data to allow drect comparson of budget executon wth the orgnal budget, wth nformaton on all budget tems and both commtment and dsbursement stages; () quarterly or more frequent reports ssued wthn four weeks of the end of perod; () no materal concerns regarding data accuracy; and (iv) reliable instruments for data verification, based upon a combination of field monitoring, audit and statistical analysis.
Untl the roll-out of the ATRRS, monthly reportng by MDAs was poor, and the FMoF dd not have a clear pcture of budget executon. Ths has mproved, and release of current and captal spendng to MDAs s now supposed to be condtonal on reports havng been receved, wth stronger enforcement by FMoF than before. But, whle mnsteral reportng has mproved, ths cannot be sad for other parts of government. There are no regular n-year reports of use of budget funds by parastatals, federal extra-budgetary funds and autonomous agences. In-year reportng by MDAs at the state government level s very uneven and performance s not lnked to release of cash.
Physcal montorng of projects has always been weak n Ngera. Although each agency usually has a montorng unt n-house, they produce lttle and are held n low esteem. Travellng to vst a project has tradtonally been seen as a way of generatng per dems and other benefits, with reporting on outputs a secondary objective. Agan t s hoped that the more rgorous approach to reportng and montorng of the MDG projects wll lead the way to better across the board practces. If t contnues, weak reportng wll leave the government ncreasngly open to dverson of funds and outrght corrupton. Techncal mprovements are straghtforward, but the real test s a governance one -whether the purpose of budgets s the spendng of money as an end n tself, or as a means to produce socally desrable outputs, whch are expected to be verified.
PI-25: Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements
The standard here s the tmely producton of consoldated government statements, which include full information on revenue, expenditure and financial assets/liabilites, consstent wth IPSAS or equvalent natonal standards, and are submtted for external audit within six months of the end of the fiscal year.
Ths s an area where performance at the federal level has been exceptonally poor -as of the beginning of 2006, no full set of audited government financial statements have been presented to the Natonal Assembly snce 2001, to the consternaton of legslators. However, an effort s under way to reduce the backlog of late accounts. A major reason for the backlog s the delay by MDAs n producng ther accounts for consoldaton by the Accountant-General. Laggards, however, have not been sanctoned, though ndcatons are that reportng dscplne s beng tghtened up. Overall, the delay n producton of accounts s a telltale of the slght mportance that has been attached over the years to financial accountability. States present a mixed picture of laggards, but there are some states whch are ahead of the federal government n producing financial accounts on time.
PI-26:Scope,natureandfollow-upofexternalaudit
The best-practce standard s for all enttes of central government to be audted annually. A full range of financial audits (covering revenue, expenditure and financial assets/labltes) and some aspects of performance audt are expected to be performed to a generally accepted standard, focusing on significant and systemic issues. Audit reports are submtted to the legslature wthn four months of the end of perod covered and, in the case of financial statements, from their receipt by the audit office. There is clear evidence of effective and timely follow-up on audit findings.
Ngera's consttuton sets a 90-day lmt for audtors-general to submt ther reports to the legislatures, and federal Financial Regulations require that the financial accounts be submitted for audit within six months of the end of the financial year.
Were ths tmetable to be adhered to, Ngera would meet the standards as far as tmelness s concerned. As already noted, the Audtor-General's chef constrant s delayed submsson of accounts to audt from the Accountant-General. Audt coverage extends to all mnstres, extra-mnsteral departments and agences, and s chiefly compliance based.
Surprisingly, there is currently no specific legislation covering the powers and dutes of the Audtor-General, the prevous law havng been excluded from the 1991 consolidation of laws of Nigeria. But authority for the office is conveyed by the Consttuton, and absence of a statutory framework (mrrored also by most states) does not seem to have been a hndrance, though enactment of a modern procurement law would provde an opportunty to modernze also audt strategy and methods. A new Audt Bll s before the Natonal Assembly, and would strengthen the ndependence of the supreme audit authority, freeing his office from debilitating civil service rules. Follow-up of audit findings is weak. There is no formal mechanism of reporting back to the Public Accounts Committees (PACs) on actions taken on previous findngs, and no systematc follow-up of actons taken by the executve. Moves are afoot to gve the FMoF the authorty to do ths. A new audt law would not only mandate reporting back on actions taken, but also spell out the penalties for accounting officers of non-complyng MDAs. On ts part, there s a need for the supreme audt nsttuton to be more ambtous n ts audts, focusng scarce staff resources on hgh-rsk areas, and more frankly evaluating the efficacy of financial control systems. There also needs to be more aggressive follow-up of individual audit findings by MDAs.
PI-27:Legislativescrutinyoftheannualbudgetlaw
The benchmark best practice is for the legislature's review to cover fiscal policies, medium-term fiscal framework and priorities, as well as details of revenue and expenditure. The legislature's procedures for review should be firmly established and respected, wth at least two months to revew the budget proposals. Clear rules should exst for n-year budget amendments by the executve, whch set strct lmts on extent and nature of amendments and are consstently respected.
Snce the return to democracy, there has been actve scrutny of the executve's budget proposals by the legslature. Unlke n most other Afrcan countres, whch began wth a Westmnster model of government, Ngera, n pursut of US-type consttutonal arrangements entalng a full separaton of powers, mposes no constrants on the extent to whch the legslature can change the budget put forward by the executve. State legslatures have dentcal powers, though they have generally tended not to use them. In many of the years snce the return to cvlan rule, there have been bitter fights over the respective roles of the federal executive and the legislature in budget-making, resulting in gross inflation of ex ante budget, chiefly by Assembly's addng new programmes and projects. In turn, ths has prompted the executve to use the cash release system to selectvely mplement the budget as passed, and so to restore orgnal spendng prortes. Although the 2006 budget was a lttle better, ths antagonstc relatonshp between the executve and the legslature has typcally delayed the approval of the new budget until well into the first half of the new financal year.
There are steps beng undertaken to make budget-makng less confrontatonal. When the Fscal Responsblty Law s passed, each ter of government wll have to make its budgets consistent with the fiscal framework set by the FMoF. The independent Budget Process Bll would mandate a two-stage process of budget approval, though t mght dangerously shft budget-makng power towards the legslature, a stuaton of concern to many observers, gven the legslature's evdent lack of spendng constrants. Clear rules exst for n-year budget amendments by the executve, orgnatng n the Fnance (Control and Management) Act of 1958, but over the years a great deal of abuse has crept in. The challenge is twofold. The first part is to install a modern financial management legal framework for transparent and accountable spendng of publc mones. The second part s ensurng that the legal framework for PFM n Ngera, once t has been modernzed, s taken serously by all budget actors.
PI-28:Legislativescrutinyofexternalauditreports
Best practce calls for scrutny of audt reports by the legslature wthn three months of receipt, in-depth hearings in which officers of the audited department participate, and the ssue of recommendatons by the legslature to be mplemented by the government.
